[ISN] ASSESSMENT: Corporate Threat Intelligence Versus Actual Intelligence Products

http://www.infosecnews.org/assessment-corporate-threat-intelligence-versus-actual-intelligence-products/ By Scot Terban Special to InfoSec News March 10, 2014 Threat Intelligence: Threat intelligence is the new hotness in the field of information security and there are many players who want your money to give you their interpretation of it. Crowdstrike, Mandiant, and a host of others all offer what they call threat intelligence but what is it really in the end that the customer gets when they receive a report? Too often what I am seeing is reports based on suppositions and little critical thinking rather than the traditional raison dartre of a threat intelligence report on actors that may have an interest in your environment. A case in point is the report from HP that was conveniently released right in time for this years RSA conference in San Francisco. This report on the Iranian cyber threat was hard to read due to the lack of real product or knowledge thereof that would have made this report useful to anyone seeking true threat intelligence on an actor that may have interests in them. With a long winded assortment of Googling as Open Source Intelligence, this report makes assumptions on state actors motivations as well as non state actors who may, or may not, be acting on behalf of the Basij or the Iranian government altogether. While the use of Google and OSINT is indeed a valid way of gathering said intelligence, intelligence is not “intelligence” until proper analysis is carried out on it. This was one of the primary problems with the HP report, the analysis was lacking as was the use of an intelligence analyst who knew what they were doing. Clients and Products: When carrying out any kind of intelligence gathering and analysis you must first have a client for the product. In the intelligence game you have “products” that “clients” consume and in the case of the HP report on Iranian actors it is unclear as to whom the client is to be here. There are no direct ties to any one sector or actor for the intelligence to have any true “threat matrix” meaning and thus this report is of no real use. These are fairly important factors when generating an analysis of a threat actor and the threat vectors that may affect them when creating a report that should be tailored to the client paying for it. Of course the factors of threat actors and vectors of attack can be general at times and I assume that the HP analyst was trying to use this rather wide open interpretation to sell a report as a means to an end to sell HP services in the near future. I am also willing to bet that this report was a deliberate drop for RSAC, and they had a kiosk somewhere where they were hawking their new “Threat Intelligence” services to anyone who might want to pay for them. In the case of this threat intelligence report ask yourself just who the client is here. Who is indeed really under threat by the alleged Iranian hackers that are listed. What sectors of industry are we talking about and who are their primary targets of choice thus far? In the case of Iran there has been also a great deal of supposition as to these actors and their motives. The report makes allusions to state actor intentions, but only lists known Iranian hacker groups that may or may not have affiliations with the government. The same can be said for their TTP’s and other alleged data within the report. The important bit about threat intelligence in the world of information security is that you need hard data to model the threats and the actors for your specific company and this report generates none of this. This fact makes the report not really threat intelligence at all, not in the aspect of either true intelligence nor corporate intelligence. http://krypt3ia.wordpress.com/2014/03/09/assessment-corporate-threat-intelligence-versus-actual-intelligence-products/ […]