Tag Archives: option

Optimized Squid Config for Squid v4.0.4

For those of you who are squid optimization geeks. Below is my latest iteration of the squid.conf file I am now using for 4.0.4

#
#Recommended minimum configuration:
#
always_direct allow all

# 3 workers, using worker #1 as the frontend is important

# Example rule allowing access from your local networks.
# Adapt to list your (internal) IP networks from where browsing
# should be allowed
acl localnet src 192.168.0.0/16
acl localnet src fc00::/7
acl localnet src fe80::/10 # RFC1918 possible internal network
acl Safe_ports port 1-65535 # RFC1918 possible internal network
acl CONNECT method GET POST HEAD OPTIONS CONNECT PUT DELETE # RFC1918 possible internal network
#acl block-fnes urlpath_regex -i .*/fnes/echo # RFC 4193 local private network range
acl noscan dstdomain symantecliveupdate.com liveupdate.symantec.com psi3.secunia.com update.immunet.com avstats.avira.com premium.avira-update.com 8f8fb293be49781da3e3229cd4469a18.da3e3.net # RFC 4291 link-local (directly plugged) machines

# Disable alternate protocols
request_header_access Alternate-Protocol deny all
reply_header_access Alternate-Protocol deny all

#acl video urlpath_regex -i \.(mpa|m2a|mpe|avi|mov|mpg|mpg3|mpg4|mpeg|m1s|mp2v|m2v|m2s|wmx|rm|rmvb|3pg|3gpp|omg|ogm|asf|asx|mp2|mp3|mp4|wmv|flv|ts|f4v|f4m)

#
# Recommended minimum Access Permission configuration:
#
# Only allow cachemgr access from localhost

no_cache deny noscan
always_direct allow noscan
#no_cache deny video
#always_direct allow video

# Deny requests to certain unsafe ports

# Deny CONNECT to other than secure SSL ports

# We strongly recommend the following be uncommented to protect innocent
# web applications running on the proxy server who think the only
# one who can access services on .localhost. is a local user
#http_access deny to_localhost

#
# INSERT YOUR OWN RULE(S) HERE TO ALLOW ACCESS FROM YOUR CLIENTS
#
#cache_peer 192.168.1.1 parent 8080 0 default no-query no-digest no-netdb-exchange
#never_direct allow all

# Example rule allowing access from your local networks.
# Adapt localnet in the ACL section to list your (internal) IP networks
# from where browsing should be allowed

http_access allow all

# allow localhost always proxy functionality

# And finally deny all other access to this proxy

# Squid normally listens to port 3128
pipeline_prefetch 7
read_ahead_gap 256 MB
client_request_buffer_max_size 4096 KB
request_header_max_size 2048 KB
reply_header_max_size 2048 KB
#quick_abort_min -1 KB
#quick_abort_pct 100
#range_offset_limit -1
eui_lookup off
http_port 0.0.0.0:8080 intercept disable-pmtu-discovery=always
http_port 0.0.0.0:3128
tcp_outgoing_address 192.168.2.2
connect_retries 1

client_persistent_connections on
server_persistent_connections on
detect_broken_pconn on

# We recommend you to use at least the following line.
#hierarchy_stoplist cgi-bin ?

# Uncomment and adjust the following to add a disk cache directory.
#cache_dir diskd /ssd/0 54000 32 256 Q1=256 Q2=144
#cache_dir diskd /ssd/1 54000 32 256 Q1=256 Q2=144
#cache_dir diskd /ssd/3 54000 32 256 Q1=256 Q2=144

#cache_dir diskd /ssd2/0 68000 32 256 Q1=256 Q2=144
#cache_dir diskd /ssd2/1 68000 32 256 Q1=256 Q2=144
#cache_dir diskd /ssd2/3 68000 32 256 Q1=256 Q2=144

cache_dir ufs /ssd/0 32000 1024 256
cache_dir ufs /ssd/1 32000 1024 256
cache_dir ufs /ssd/2 32000 1024 256
cache_dir ufs /ssd/3 32000 1024 256
cache_dir ufs /ssd/4 32000 1024 256
cache_dir ufs /ssd/5 32000 1024 256

cache_dir ufs /ssd2/0 43000 1024 256
cache_dir ufs /ssd2/1 43000 1024 256
cache_dir ufs /ssd2/2 43000 1024 256
cache_dir ufs /ssd2/3 43000 1024 256
cache_dir ufs /ssd2/4 43000 1024 256
cache_dir ufs /ssd2/6 43000 1024 256

store_dir_select_algorithm round-robin
#cache_replacement_policy heap GDSF
#memory_replacement_policy heap GDSF

# Leave coredumps in the first cache dir
coredump_dir /var/cache/squid

# Add any of your own refresh_pattern entries above these.
# General Rules
#cache images

refresh_pattern -i \.(gif|png|ico|jpg|jpeg|jp2|webp)$ 100000 90% 200000 override-expire reload-into-ims ignore-no-store ignore-private
refresh_pattern -i \.(jpx|j2k|j2c|fpx|bmp|tif|tiff|bif)$ 100000 90% 20000 override-expire reload-into-ims ignore-no-store ignore-private
refresh_pattern -i \.(pcd|pict|rif|exif|hdr|bpg|img|jif|jfif)$ 100000 90% 200000 override-expire reload-into-ims ignore-no-store ignore-private
refresh_pattern -i \.(woff|woff2|eps|ttf|otf|svg|svgi|svgz|ps|ps1|acsm|eot)$ 100000 90% 200000 override-expire reload-into-ims ignore-no-store ignore-private

#cache content
refresh_pattern -i \.(swf|js|ejs)$ 100000 90% 200000 override-expire reload-into-ims ignore-no-store ignore-private
refresh_pattern -i \.(wav|css|class|dat|zsci|ver|advcs)$ 100000 90% 200000 override-expire reload-into-ims ignore-no-store ignore-private

#cache videos
refresh_pattern -i \.(mpa|m2a|mpe|avi|mov|mpg|mpeg|mpg3|mpg4|mpg5)$ 0 90% 200000 reload-into-ims ignore-no-store ignore-private
refresh_pattern -i \.(m1s|mp2v|m2v|m2s|m2ts|wmx|rm|rmvb|3pg|3gpp|omg|ogm|asf|war)$ 0 90% 200000 reload-into-ims ignore-no-store ignore-private
refresh_pattern -i \.(asx|mp2|mp3|mp4|mp5|wmv|flv|mts|f4v|f4|pls|midi|mid)$ 0 90% 200000 reload-into-ims ignore-no-store ignore-private
refresh_pattern -i \.(htm|html)$ 9440 90% 200000 reload-into-ims ignore-no-store ignore-private
refresh_pattern -i \.(xml|flow|asp|aspx)$ 0 90% 200000
refresh_pattern -i \.(json)$ 0 90% 200000
refresh_pattern -i (/cgi-bin/|\?) 0 90% 200000

#live video cache rules
refresh_pattern -i \.(m3u8|ts)$ 0 90% 200000

#cache specific sites
refresh_pattern -i ^http:\/\/liveupdate.symantecliveupdate.com.*\(zip)$ 0 0% 0
refresh_pattern -i ^http:\/\/premium.avira-update.com.*\(gz) 0 0% 0
refresh_pattern -i microsoft.com/.*\.(cab|exe|msi|msu|msf|asf|wma|dat|zip)$ 4320 80% 43200
refresh_pattern -i windowsupdate.com/.*\.(cab|exe|msi|msu|msf|asf|wma|wmv)|dat|zip)$ 4320 80% 43200
refresh_pattern -i windows.com/.*\.(cab|exe|msi|msu|msf|asf|wmv|wma|dat|zip)$ 4320 80% 43200
refresh_pattern -i apple.com/.*\.(cab|exe|msi|msu|msf|asf|wmv|wma|dat|zip|dist)$ 0 80% 4320

#cache binaries
refresh_pattern -i \.(app|bin|deb|rpm|drpm|exe|zip|zipx|tar|tgz|tbz2|tlz|iso|arj|cfs|dar|jar)$ 100000 90% 200000 override-expire reload-into-ims ignore-no-store ignore-private
refresh_pattern -i \.(bz|bz2|ipa|ram|rar|uxx|gz|msi|dll|lz|lzma|7z|s7z|Z|z|zz|sz)$ 100000 90% 200000 override-expire reload-into-ims ignore-no-store ignore-private
refresh_pattern -i \.(exe|msi)$ 0 90% 200000
refresh_pattern -i \.(cab|psf|vidt|apk|wtex|hz|ova|ovf)$ 100000 90% 200000 override-expire reload-into-ims ignore-no-store ignore-private

#cache microsoft and adobe and other documents
refresh_pattern -i \.(ppt|pptx|doc|docx|docm|docb|dot|pdf|pub|ps)$ 100000 90% 200000 override-expire reload-into-ims ignore-no-store ignore-private
refresh_pattern -i \.(xls|xlsx|xlt|xlm|xlsm|xltm|xlw|csv|txt)$ 100000 90% 200000 override-expire reload-into-ims ignore-no-store ignore-private
#refresh_pattern -i ^ftp: 100000 90% 200000
#refresh_pattern -i ^gopher: 1440 0% 1440

#allow caching of other things based on cache control headers with some exceptions
refresh_pattern -i . 0 90% 200000

log_icp_queries off
icp_port 0
htcp_port 0
acl snmppublic snmp_community public
snmp_port 3401
snmp_incoming_address 192.168.2.2
snmp_access allow snmppublic all
minimum_object_size 0 KB
cache_effective_user squid
#header_replace User-Agent Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U;) Gecko/20080221 Firefox/2.0.0.9
vary_ignore_expire on
cache_swap_low 90
cache_swap_high 95
visible_hostname shadow
unique_hostname shadow-DHS
shutdown_lifetime 0 second
request_entities on
half_closed_clients off
max_filedesc 65535
connect_timeout 10 seconds
cache_effective_group squid
buffered_logs on
#access_log /var/log/squid/access.log squid
access_log daemon:/var/log/squid/access.log buffer-size=256KB
#access_log none
netdb_filename none
client_db off
dns_nameservers 127.0.0.1 127.0.0.1 192.168.2.2 192.168.1.96
ipcache_size 10000
ipcache_low 90
ipcache_high 95
dns_v4_first on
negative_ttl 5 minutes
positive_dns_ttl 30 days
negative_dns_ttl 5 minutes
dns_retransmit_interval 1 seconds
check_hostnames off
forwarded_for delete
via off
httpd_suppress_version_string on
# mem and cache size
#collapsed_forwarding on
cache_mem 4 GB
memory_cache_mode disk
maximum_object_size 2 GB
maximum_object_size_in_memory 2 GB
digest_generation off
#digest_bits_per_entry 8
pinger_enable off
memory_pools on
max_stale 4 months




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My latest optimized squid proxy squid.conf configuration file (squid version 4.0.3)

#You will need to replace x.x.x.x with your own ip configuration. The refresh policy included in this configuration cached hits in the range of 40-60%

 

#
#Recommended minimum configuration:
#
always_direct allow all

# Example rule allowing access from your local networks.
# Adapt to list your (internal) IP networks from where browsing
# should be allowed
acl localnet src x.x.0.0/16
acl localnet src fc00::/7
acl localnet src fe80::/10 # RFC1918 possible internal network
acl Safe_ports port 1-65535 # RFC1918 possible internal network
acl CONNECT method GET POST HEAD OPTIONS CONNECT PUT DELETE # RFC1918 possible internal network
#acl block-fnes urlpath_regex -i .*/fnes/echo # RFC 4193 local private network range
acl noscan dstdomain symantecliveupdate.com liveupdate.symantec.com psi3.secunia.com update.immunet.com avstats.avira.com premium.avira-update.com 8f8fb293be49781da3e3229cd4469a18.da3e3.net # RFC 4291 link-local (directly plugged) machines

#acl video urlpath_regex -i \.(mpa|m2a|mpe|avi|mov|mpg|mpg3|mpg4|mpeg|m1s|mp2v|m2v|m2s|wmx|rm|rmvb|3pg|3gpp|omg|ogm|asf|asx|mp2|mp3|mp4|wmv|flv|ts|f4v|f4m)

#
# Recommended minimum Access Permission configuration:
#
# Only allow cachemgr access from localhost

no_cache deny noscan
always_direct allow noscan
#no_cache deny video
#always_direct allow video

# Deny requests to certain unsafe ports

# Deny CONNECT to other than secure SSL ports

# We strongly recommend the following be uncommented to protect innocent
# web applications running on the proxy server who think the only
# one who can access services on .localhost. is a local user
#http_access deny to_localhost

#
# INSERT YOUR OWN RULE(S) HERE TO ALLOW ACCESS FROM YOUR CLIENTS
#
#cache_peer 192.168.1.1 parent 8080 0 default no-query no-digest no-netdb-exchange
#never_direct allow all

# Example rule allowing access from your local networks.
# Adapt localnet in the ACL section to list your (internal) IP networks
# from where browsing should be allowed

http_access allow all

# allow localhost always proxy functionality

# And finally deny all other access to this proxy
# Squid normally listens to port 3128
pipeline_prefetch 4
read_ahead_gap 256 MB
client_request_buffer_max_size 16 MB
#quick_abort_min -1 KB
#quick_abort_pct 100
#range_offset_limit -1
eui_lookup off
http_port 0.0.0.0:8080 intercept disable-pmtu-discovery=always
http_port 0.0.0.0:3128
tcp_outgoing_address x.x.x.x
connect_retries 2

client_persistent_connections on
server_persistent_connections on
detect_broken_pconn on

# We recommend you to use at least the following line.
#hierarchy_stoplist cgi-bin ?
# Uncomment and adjust the following to add a disk cache directory.
#cache_dir diskd /ssd/0 54000 32 256 Q1=256 Q2=144
#cache_dir diskd /ssd/1 54000 32 256 Q1=256 Q2=144
#cache_dir diskd /ssd/3 54000 32 256 Q1=256 Q2=144

#cache_dir diskd /ssd2/0 68000 32 256 Q1=256 Q2=144
#cache_dir diskd /ssd2/1 68000 32 256 Q1=256 Q2=144
#cache_dir diskd /ssd2/3 68000 32 256 Q1=256 Q2=144

cache_dir ufs /ssd/0 54000 128 512
cache_dir ufs /ssd/1 54000 128 512
cache_dir ufs /ssd/3 54000 128 512

cache_dir ufs /ssd2/0 68000 128 512
cache_dir ufs /ssd2/1 68000 128 512
cache_dir ufs /ssd2/3 68000 128 512

store_dir_select_algorithm round-robin
#cache_replacement_policy heap GDSF
#memory_replacement_policy heap GDSF

# Leave coredumps in the first cache dir
coredump_dir /var/cache/squid
# Add any of your own refresh_pattern entries above these.
# General Rules
#cache images

refresh_pattern -i \.(gif|png|ico|jpg|jpeg|jp2|webp)$ 100000 90% 200000 override-expire reload-into-ims ignore-no-store ignore-private refresh-ims
refresh_pattern -i \.(jpx|j2k|j2c|fpx|bmp|tif|tiff|bif)$ 100000 90% 20000 override-expire reload-into-ims ignore-no-store ignore-private refresh-ims
refresh_pattern -i \.(pcd|pict|rif|exif|hdr|bpg|img|jif|jfif)$ 100000 90% 200000 override-expire reload-into-ims ignore-no-store ignore-private refresh-ims
refresh_pattern -i \.(woff|woff2|eps|ttf|otf|svg|svgi|svgz|ps|ps1|acsm|eot)$ 100000 90% 200000 override-expire reload-into-ims ignore-no-store ignore-private refresh-ims

#cache content
refresh_pattern -i \.(swf|js|ejs)$ 100000 90% 200000 override-expire reload-into-ims ignore-no-store ignore-private refresh-ims
refresh_pattern -i \.(wav|css|class|dat|zsci|ver|advcs)$ 100000 90% 200000 override-expire reload-into-ims ignore-no-store ignore-private refresh-ims

#cache videos
refresh_pattern -i \.(mpa|m2a|mpe|avi|mov|mpg|mpeg|mpg3|mpg4|mpg5)$ 100000 90% 200000 override-expire reload-into-ims ignore-no-store ignore-private refresh-ims
refresh_pattern -i \.(m1s|mp2v|m2v|m2s|m2ts|wmx|rm|rmvb|3pg|3gpp|omg|ogm|asf|war)$ 100000 90% 200000 override-expire reload-into-ims ignore-no-store ignore-private refresh-ims
refresh_pattern -i \.(asx|mp2|mp3|mp4|mp5|wmv|flv|mts|f4v|f4|pls|midi|mid)$ 100000 90% 200000 override-expire reload-into-ims ignore-no-store ignore-private refresh-ims
refresh_pattern -i \.(htm|html)$ 9440 90% 200000 reload-into-ims ignore-no-store ignore-private refresh-ims
refresh_pattern -i \.(xml|flow|asp|aspx)$ 0 90% 200000 refresh-ims
refresh_pattern -i \.(json)$ 0 90% 200000 refresh-ims
refresh_pattern -i (/cgi-bin/|\?) 0 90% 200000

#live video cache rules
refresh_pattern -i \.(m3u8|ts)$ 0 90% 200000 refresh-ims

#cache specific sites
refresh_pattern -i ^http:\/\/liveupdate.symantecliveupdate.com.*\(zip)$ 0 0% 0
refresh_pattern -i ^http:\/\/premium.avira-update.com.*\(gz) 0 0% 0
refresh_pattern -i microsoft.com/.*\.(cab|exe|msi|msu|msf|asf|wma|dat|zip)$ 4320 80% 43200 reload-into-ims refresh-ims
refresh_pattern -i windowsupdate.com/.*\.(cab|exe|msi|msu|msf|asf|wma|wmv)|dat|zip)$ 4320 80% 43200 reload-into-ims refresh-ims
refresh_pattern -i windows.com/.*\.(cab|exe|msi|msu|msf|asf|wmv|wma|dat|zip)$ 4320 80% 43200 reload-into-ims refresh-ims
refresh_pattern -i apple.com/.*\.(cab|exe|msi|msu|msf|asf|wmv|wma|dat|zip|dist)$ 0 80% 43200 reload-into-ims refresh-ims

#cache binaries
refresh_pattern -i \.(app|bin|deb|rpm|drpm|exe|zip|zipx|tar|tgz|tbz2|tlz|iso|arj|cfs|dar|jar)$ 100000 90% 200000 override-expire reload-into-ims ignore-no-store ignore-private refresh-ims
refresh_pattern -i \.(bz|bz2|ipa|ram|rar|uxx|gz|msi|dll|lz|lzma|7z|s7z|Z|z|zz|sz)$ 100000 90% 200000 override-expire reload-into-ims ignore-no-store ignore-private refresh-ims
refresh_pattern -i \.(exe|msi)$ 0 90% 200000 refresh-ims
refresh_pattern -i \.(cab|psf|vidt|apk|wtex|hz|ova|ovf)$ 100000 90% 200000 override-expire reload-into-ims ignore-no-store ignore-private refresh-ims

#cache microsoft and adobe and other documents
refresh_pattern -i \.(ppt|pptx|doc|docx|docm|docb|dot|pdf|pub|ps)$ 100000 90% 200000 override-expire reload-into-ims ignore-no-store ignore-private refresh-ims
refresh_pattern -i \.(xls|xlsx|xlt|xlm|xlsm|xltm|xlw|csv|txt)$ 100000 90% 200000 override-expire reload-into-ims ignore-no-store ignore-private refresh-ims
#refresh_pattern -i ^ftp: 100000 90% 200000
#refresh_pattern -i ^gopher: 1440 0% 1440

#allow caching of other things based on cache control headers with some exceptions
refresh_pattern -i . 0 90% 200000 refresh-ims

log_icp_queries off
icp_port 0
htcp_port 0
acl snmppublic snmp_community public
snmp_port 3401
snmp_incoming_address x.x.x.x
snmp_access allow snmppublic all
minimum_object_size 0 KB
cache_effective_user squid
#header_replace User-Agent Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U;) Gecko/20080221 Firefox/2.0.0.9
vary_ignore_expire on
cache_swap_low 90
cache_swap_high 95
visible_hostname shadow
unique_hostname shadow-DHS
shutdown_lifetime 0 second
request_header_max_size 2048 KB
reply_header_max_size 2048 KB
request_entities on
half_closed_clients off
max_filedesc 65535
connect_timeout 15 seconds
cache_effective_group squid
buffered_logs on
#access_log /var/log/squid/access.log squid
access_log daemon:/var/log/squid/access.log buffer-size=1024KB
#access_log none
netdb_filename none
client_db off
dns_nameservers x.x.x.x x.x.x.x x.x.x.x
ipcache_size 10000
ipcache_low 90
ipcache_high 95
dns_v4_first on
negative_ttl 5 minutes
positive_dns_ttl 30 days
negative_dns_ttl 5 minutes
dns_retransmit_interval 1 seconds
check_hostnames off
forwarded_for delete
via off
httpd_suppress_version_string on
# mem and cache size
#collapsed_forwarding on
cache_mem 8 GB
memory_cache_mode disk
maximum_object_size 2 GB
maximum_object_size_in_memory 2 GB
digest_generation off
#digest_bits_per_entry 8
pinger_enable off
memory_pools on
max_stale 4 months


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[ISN] What are Top HIPAA Compliance Concerns, Obstacles?

healthitsecurity.com/news/what-are-top-hipaa-compliance-concerns-obstacles By Elizabeth Snell Health IT Security January 25, 2016 Maintaining HIPAA compliance should always be a key area for leaders in the healthcare industry, but as technology continues to evolve, there are numerous factors coming into play that could affect how organizations keep patient data secure. But what type of obstacles are standing in provider’s’ way? Are there certain difficulties when it comes to HIPAA compliance? We’ve previously discussed the legal perspective on HIPAA regulations, and various experts in the field have claimed that “it’s not a matter of if, but a matter of when” a data breach will take place. Recent OCR HIPAA settlements not only show that size is not a factor when it comes to enforcement, but that organizations need to be mindful of everything from physical safeguards to conducting regular risk assessments. Technical advancements have also proven to be potentially beneficial to covered entities. Whether an organization is looking to implement secure messaging options or potentially invest in cloud storage, privacy and security issues cannot be overlooked. […]


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[ISN] U.S. government wants in on the public cloud, but needs more transparency

www.computerworld.com/article/3006360/security/us-government-wants-in-on-the-public-cloud-but-needs-more-transparency.html By Blair Hanley Frank IDG News Service Nov 18, 2015 The federal government is trying to move more into the cloud, but service providers’ lack of transparency is harming adoption, according to Arlette Hart, the FBI’s chief information security officer. “There’s a big piece of cloud that’s the ‘trust me’ model of cloud computing,” she said during an on-stage interview at the Structure conference in San Francisco on Wednesday. That’s a tough sell for organizations like the federal government that have to worry about protecting important data. While Hart said that the federal government wants to get at the “enormous value” in public cloud infrastructure, its interest in moving to public cloud infrastructure is also tied to a need for greater security. While major providers like Amazon and Microsoft offer tools that meet the U.S. government’s regulations, not every cloud provider is set up along those lines. In Hart’s view, cloud providers need to be more transparent about what they do with security so the government and other customers can verify that their practices are sufficient for protecting data. […]


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[ISN] When Security Experts Gather to Talk Consensus, Chaos Ensues

http://www.wired.com/2015/10/security-experts-gather-talk-consensus-chaos-ensues/ By Kim Zetter Security Wired.com 10.01.15 SECURITY RESEARCHERS AND vendors have long been locked in a debate over how to disclose security vulnerabilities, and there’s little on which the two sides agree. Apparently this extends even to the question of whether they should meet to hash out their disagreements. That’s the conclusion after a coalition of security vendors, academics, lawyers, and researchers gathered at UC Berkeley on Tuesday to discuss how to improve the sometimes-hostile system for reporting software vulnerabilities. But the diverse group of participants had a hard time even agreeing on the purpose of the meeting: Was it to draft a charter for best practices in reporting software vulnerabilities? Was it to reform parts of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to make them less hostile to researchers? Or was it to develop guidelines for companies interested in launching bug bounty programs? The participants hit another sticking point when they tried to determine if they should hold a second meeting. “I spent $2,000 [to come to this meeting],” Dave Aitel, CEO and founder of the Florida-based security firm Immunity, told attendees. Whether or not there’s a second meeting, “should at least be an option” for discussion. […]


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[ISN] As containers take off, so do security concerns

http://www.csoonline.com/article/2984543/vulnerabilities/as-containers-take-off-so-do-security-concerns.html By Maria Korolov CSO Sep 17, 2015 Containers offer a quick and easy way to package up applications and all their dependencies, and are popular with testing and development. According to a recent survey sponsored by container data management company Cluster HQ, 73 percent of enterprises are currently using containers for development and testing, but only 39 percent are using them in a production environment. But this is changing, with 65 percent saying that they plan to use containers in production in the next 12 months, and cited security as their biggest worry. According to the survey, just over 60 percent said that security was either a major or a moderate barrier to adoption. Containers can be run within virtual machines or on traditional servers. The idea is somewhat similar to that of a virtual machine itself, except that while a virtual machine includes a full copy of the operating system, a container does not, making them faster and easier to load up. […]


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[ISN] Developing a Proportionate Response to a Cyber Incident

http://www.cfr.org/cybersecurity/developing-proportionate-response-cyber-incident/p36927 By Tobias Feakin Senior Analyst and Director International Cyber Policy Centre Australian Strategic Policy Institute Council on Foreign Relations Press August 2015 As offensive cyber activity becomes more prevalent, policymakers will be challenged to develop proportionate responses to disruptive or destructive attacks. Already, there has been significant pressure to “do something” in light of the allegedly state-sponsored attacks on Sony Pictures Entertainment and the Sands Casino. But finding a timely, proportionate, legal, and discriminatory response is complicated by the difficulty in assessing the damage to national interests and the frequent use of proxies. Perpetrators have plausible deniability, frustrating efforts to assign responsibility. Past experience suggests that most policy responses have been ad hoc. In determining the appropriate response to a state-sponsored cyber incident, policymakers will need to consider three variables: the intelligence community’s confidence in its attribution of responsibility, the impact of the incident, and the levers of national power at a state’s disposal. While these variables will help guide responses to a disruptive or destructive cyberattack, policymakers will also need to take two steps before an incident occurs. First, policymakers will need to work with the private sector to determine the effect of an incident on their operations. Second, governments need to develop a menu of preplanned response options and assess the potential impact of any response on political, economic, intelligence, and military interests. […]


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[ISN] Overcoming paralysis – why financial services organisations have to race to update their Windows Server strategy

http://www.bobsguide.com/guide/news/2015/Jul/6/overcoming-paralysis-why-financial-services-organisations-have-to-race-to-update-their-windows-server-strategy.html By Dave Foreman, ECS, Practice Director Bob’s Guide July 6, 2015 Most of the technical support teams we work with know their Microsoft Server operating system inside out and have hardly lifted their phone to call Microsoft support in years. But this well-oiled machine is about to become IT departments’ biggest headache. With the end of Microsoft’s support for Server 2003 on July 14th 2015, migration from this rather old operating system has escalated from being a niggling worry to a high-risk agenda item. Only a handful of businesses have started their migration and even they will have to rely on Microsoft extended support. But this is not a cost-effective or risk-free option in the long term. At some point a new vulnerability in the operating system will be discovered and exploited; businesses will be exposed and the regulators will have a stronger case for non-compliance. According to the credit card industry’s PCI Security Council standards, if an unsupported operating system is Internet-facing, it will be logged as an automatic compliance failure. CIOs are caught between a rock and a hard place. Nobody wants to be caught in a position where they have to answer tough questions about plans to meet compliance and mitigate risk. […]


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