Tag Archives: capability

[ISN] CarolinaCon-12 – March 2016 – FINAL ANNOUNCEMENT

Forwarded from: Vic Vandal CarolinaCon-12 will be held on March 4th-6th, 2016 in Raleigh NC. For the cheap price of $40 YOU could get a full weekend of talks, hacks, contests, and parties. Regarding the price increase to $40, it was forced due to ever-rising venue costs. But we promise to provide more value via; great talks, great side events, kickass new attendee badges, cool giveaways, etc. We’ve selected as many presentations as we can fit into the lineup. Here they are, in no particular order: – Mo Money Mo Problems: The Cashout – Benjamin Brown – Breaking Android apps for fun and profit – Bill Sempf – Gettin’ Vishy with it – Owen / Snide- @LinuxBlog – Buffer Overflows for x86, x86_64 and ARM – John F. Davis (Math 400) – Surprise! Everything can kill you. – fort – Advanced Reconnaissance Framework – Solray – Introducing PS>Attack, a portable PowerShell attack toolkit – Jared Haight – Reverse Engineer iOS apps because reasons – twinlol – FLOSS every day – automatically extracting obfuscated strings from malware – Moritz Raabe and William Ballenthin – John the Ripper sits in the next cubicle: Cracking passwords in a Corporate environment – Steve Passino – Dynamic Analysis with Windows Performance Toolkit – DeBuG (John deGruyter) – Deploying a Shadow Threat Intel Capability: Understanding YOUR Adversaries without Expensive Security Tools – grecs – AR Hacking: How to turn One Gun Into Five Guns – Deviant Ollam – Reporting for Hackers – Jon Molesa @th3mojo – Never Go Full Spectrum – Cyber Randy – I Am The Liquor – Jim Lahey CarolinaCon-12 Contests/Challenges/Events: – Capture The Flag – Crypto Challenge – Lockpicking Village – Hardware Hack-Shop – Hacker Trivia – Unofficial CC Shootout LODGING: If you’re traveling and wish to stay at the Con hotel here is the direct link to the CarolinaCon discount group rate: www.hilton.com/en/hi/groups/personalized/R/RDUNHHF-CCC-20160303/index.jhtml NOTE: The website defaults to March 3rd-6th instead of March 4th-6th and the group rate is no longer available on March 3rd. So make sure that you change the reservation dates to get the group rate. ATTENTION: The discount group rate on Hilton hotel rooms expires THIS weekend on JANUARY 31st 2016, so act quickly if you plan on staying at the hotel for all of the weekend fun and you want the group rate. CarolinaCon formal proceedings/talks will run; – 7pm to 11pm on Friday – 10am to 9pm on Saturday – 10am to 4pm on Sunday For presentation abstracts, speaker bios, the final schedule, side event information, and all the other exciting details (as they develop and as our webmaster gets to them) stay tuned to: www.carolinacon.org ADVERTISERS / VENDORS / SPONSORS: There are no advertisers, vendors, or sponsors allowed at CarolinaCon….ever. Please don’t waste your time or ours in asking. CarolinaCon has been Rated “M” for Mature. Peace, Vic




Facebooktwittergoogle_plusredditpinterestlinkedinmail

[ISN] Wireless Hacking In Flight: Air Force Demos Cyber EC-130

http://breakingdefense.com/2015/09/wireless-hacking-in-flight-air-force-demos-cyber-ec-130/ By SYDNEY J. FREEDBERG JR. Breaking Defense September 15, 2015 NATIONAL HARBOR: Matthew Broderick in his basement, playing Wargames over a landline, is still the pop culture archetype of a hacker. But as wireless networks became the norm, new-age cyber warfare and traditional electronic warfare are starting to merge. Hackers can move out of the basement to the sky. In a series of experiments, the US Air Force has successfully modified its EC-130 Compass Call aircraft, built to jam enemy transmissions, to attack enemy networks instead. “We’ve conducted a series of demonstrations,” said Maj. Gen. Burke Wilson, commander of the 24th Air Force, the service’s cyber operators. “Lo and behold! Yes, we’re able to touch a target and manipulate a target, [i.e.] a network, from an air[craft].” What’s more, Wilson told reporters at the Air Force Association conference here, this flying wireless attack can “touch a network that in most cases might be closed” to traditional means. While he didn’t give details, many military networks around the world are deliberately disconnected from the Internet (“air-gapped”) for better security. You can try to get an agent or dupe to bring a virus-infected thumb drive to work, as reportedly happened with Stuxnet’s penetration of the Iranian nuclear program, but that takes time and luck. You unlock a lot more virtual doors if you can just hack a network wirelessly from the air. Israeli aircraft using BAE’s Suter system reportedly did just this to Syrian air defenses in 2007’s Operation Orchard, and the Navy is interested in the capability, but this is the first I’ve heard an Air Force general discuss it. Digital AESA radar can do much the same thing, as we’ve reported about the F-35. […]


Facebooktwittergoogle_plusredditpinterestlinkedinmail

[ISN] No, You Really Can’t

https://blogs.oracle.com/maryanndavidson/entry/no_you_really_can_t Mary Ann Davidson Blog By User701213-Oracle Aug 10, 2015 I have been doing a lot of writing recently. Some of my writing has been with my sister, with whom I write murder mysteries using the nom-de-plume Maddi Davidson. Recently, we’ve been working on short stories, developing a lot of fun new ideas for dispatching people (literarily speaking, though I think about practical applications occasionally when someone tailgates me). Writing mysteries is a lot more fun than the other type of writing I’ve been doing. Recently, I have seen a large-ish uptick in customers reverse engineering our code to attempt to find security vulnerabilities in it. This is why I’ve been writing a lot of letters to customers that start with “hi, howzit, aloha” but end with “please comply with your license agreement and stop reverse engineering our code, already.” I can understand that in a world where it seems almost every day someone else had a data breach and lost umpteen gazillion records to unnamed intruders who may have been working at the behest of a hostile nation-state, people want to go the extra mile to secure their systems. That said, you would think that before gearing up to run that extra mile, customers would already have ensured they’ve identified their critical systems, encrypted sensitive data, applied all relevant patches, be on a supported product release, use tools to ensure configurations are locked down – in short, the usual security hygiene – before they attempt to find zero day vulnerabilities in the products they are using. And in fact, there are a lot of data breaches that would be prevented by doing all that stuff, as unsexy as it is, instead of hyperventilating that the Big Bad Advanced Persistent Threat using a zero-day is out to get me! Whether you are running your own IT show or a cloud provider is running it for you, there are a host of good security practices that are well worth doing. Even if you want to have reasonable certainty that suppliers take reasonable care in how they build their products – and there is so much more to assurance than running a scanning tool – there are a lot of things a customer can do like, gosh, actually talking to suppliers about their assurance programs or checking certifications for products for which there are Good Housekeeping seals for (or “good code” seals) like Common Criteria certifications or FIPS-140 certifications. Most vendors – at least, most of the large-ish ones I know – have fairly robust assurance programs now (we know this because we all compare notes at conferences). That’s all well and good, is appropriate customer due diligence and stops well short of “hey, I think I will do the vendor’s job for him/her/it and look for problems in source code myself,” even though: A customer can’t analyze the code to see whether there is a control that prevents the attack the scanning tool is screaming about (which is most likely a false positive) A customer can’t produce a patch for the problem – only the vendor can do that A customer is almost certainly violating the license agreement by using a tool that does static analysis (which operates against source code) I should state at the outset that in some cases I think the customers doing reverse engineering are not always aware of what is happening because the actual work is being done by a consultant, who runs a tool that reverse engineers the code, gets a big fat printout, drops it on the customer, who then sends it to us. Now, I should note that we don’t just accept scan reports as “proof that there is a there, there,” in part because whether you are talking static or dynamic analysis, a scan report is not proof of an actual vulnerability. Often, they are not much more than a pile of steaming … FUD. (That is what I planned on saying all along: FUD.) This is why we require customers to log a service request for each alleged issue (not just hand us a report) and provide a proof of concept (which some tools can generate). If we determine as part of our analysis that scan results could only have come from reverse engineering (in at least one case, because the report said, cleverly enough, “static analysis of Oracle XXXXXX”), we send a letter to the sinning customer, and a different letter to the sinning consultant-acting-on-customer’s behalf – reminding them of the terms of the Oracle license agreement that preclude reverse engineering, So Please Stop It Already. (In legalese, of course. The Oracle license agreement has a provision such as: “Customer may not reverse engineer, disassemble, decompile, or otherwise attempt to derive the source code of the Programs…” which we quote in our missive to the customer.) Oh, and we require customers/consultants to destroy the results of such reverse engineering and confirm they have done so. Why am I bringing this up? The main reason is that, when I see a spike in X, I try to get ahead of it. I don’t want more rounds of “you broke the license agreement,” “no, we didn’t,” yes, you did,” “no, we didn’t.” I’d rather spend my time, and my team’s time, working on helping development improve our code than argue with people about where the license agreement lines are. Now is a good time to reiterate that I’m not beating people up over this merely because of the license agreement. More like, “I do not need you to analyze the code since we already do that, it’s our job to do that, we are pretty good at it, we can – unlike a third party or a tool – actually analyze the code to determine what’s happening and at any rate most of these tools have a close to 100% false positive rate so please do not waste our time on reporting little green men in our code.” I am not running away from our responsibilities to customers, merely trying to avoid a painful, annoying, and mutually-time wasting exercise. For this reason, I want to explain what Oracle’s purpose is in enforcing our license agreement (as it pertains to reverse engineering) and, in a reasonably precise yet hand-wavy way, explain “where the line is you can’t cross or you will get a strongly-worded letter from us.” Caveat: I am not a lawyer, even if I can use words like stare decisis in random conversations. (Except with my dog, because he only understands Hawaiian, not Latin.) Ergo, when in doubt, refer to your Oracle license agreement, which trumps anything I say herein! With that in mind, a few FAQ-ish explanations: Q. What is reverse engineering? A. Generally, our code is shipped in compiled (executable) form (yes, I know that some code is interpreted). Customers get code that runs, not the code “as written.” That is for multiple reasons such as users generally only need to run code, not understand how it all gets put together, and the fact that our source code is highly valuable intellectual property (which is why we have a lot of restrictions on who accesses it and protections around it). The Oracle license agreement limits what you can do with the as-shipped code and that limitation includes the fact that you aren’t allowed to de-compile, dis-assemble, de-obfuscate or otherwise try to get source code back from executable code. There are a few caveats around that prohibition but there isn’t an “out” for “unless you are looking for security vulnerabilities in which case, no problem-o, mon!” If you are trying to get the code in a different form from the way we shipped it to you – as in, the way we wrote it before we did something to it to get it in the form you are executing, you are probably reverse engineering. Don’t. Just – don’t. Q. What is Oracle’s policy in regards to the submission of security vulnerabilities (found by tools or not)? A. We require customers to open a service request (one per vulnerability) and provide a test case to verify that the alleged vulnerability is exploitable. The purpose of this policy is to try to weed out the very large number of inaccurate findings by security tools (false positives). Q. Why are you going after consultants the customer hired? The consultant didn’t sign the license agreement! A. The customer signed the Oracle license agreement, and the consultant hired by the customer is thus bound by the customer’s signed license agreement. Otherwise everyone would hire a consultant to say (legal terms follow) “Nanny, nanny boo boo, big bad consultant can do X even if the customer can’t!” Q. What does Oracle do if there is an actual security vulnerability? A. I almost hate to answer this question because I want to reiterate that customers Should Not and Must Not reverse engineer our code. However, if there is an actual security vulnerability, we will fix it. We may not like how it was found but we aren’t going to ignore a real problem – that would be a disservice to our customers. We will, however, fix it to protect all our customers, meaning everybody will get the fix at the same time. However, we will not give a customer reporting such an issue (that they found through reverse engineering) a special (one-off) patch for the problem. We will also not provide credit in any advisories we might issue. You can’t really expect us to say “thank you for breaking the license agreement.” Q. But the tools that decompile products are getting better and easier to use, so reverse engineering will be OK in the future, right? A. Ah, no. The point of our prohibition against reverse engineering is intellectual property protection, not “how can we cleverly prevent customers from finding security vulnerabilities – bwahahahaha – so we never have to fix them – bwahahahaha.” Customers are welcome to use tools that operate on executable code but that do not reverse engineer code. To that point, customers using a third party tool or service offering would be well-served by asking questions of the tool (or tool service) provider as to a) how their tool works and b) whether they perform reverse engineering to “do what they do.” An ounce of discussion is worth a pound of “no we didn’t,” “yes you did,” “didn’t,” “did” arguments. * Q. “But I hired a really cool code consultant/third party code scanner/whatever. Why won’t mean old Oracle accept my scan results and analyze all 400 pages of the scan report?” A. Hoo-boy. I think I have repeated this so much it should be a song chorus in a really annoying hip hop piece but here goes: Oracle runs static analysis tools ourselves (heck, we make them), many of these goldurn tools are ridiculously inaccurate (sometimes the false positive rate is 100% or close to it), running a tool is nothing, the ability to analyze results is everything, and so on and so forth. We put the burden on customers or their consultants to prove there is a There, There because otherwise, we waste a boatload of time analyzing – nothing** – when we could be spending those resources, say, fixing actual security vulnerabilities. Q. But one of the issues I found was an actual security vulnerability so that justifies reverse engineering, right? A. Sigh. At the risk of being repetitive, no, it doesn’t, just like you can’t break into a house because someone left a window or door unlocked. I’d like to tell you that we run every tool ever developed against every line of code we ever wrote, but that’s not true. We do require development teams (on premises, cloud and internal development organizations) to use security vulnerability-finding tools, we’ve had a significant uptick in tools usage over the last few years (our metrics show this) and we do track tools usage as part of Oracle Software Security Assurance program. We beat up – I mean, “require” – development teams to use tools because it is very much in our interests (and customers’ interests) to find and fix problems earlier rather than later. That said, no tool finds everything. No two tools find everything. We don’t claim to find everything. That fact still doesn’t justify a customer reverse engineering our code to attempt to find vulnerabilities, especially when the key to whether a suspected vulnerability is an actual vulnerability is the capability to analyze the actual source code, which – frankly – hardly any third party will be able to do, another reason not to accept random scan reports that resulted from reverse engineering at face value, as if we needed one. Q. Hey, I’ve got an idea, why not do a bug bounty? Pay third parties to find this stuff! A. Bug bounties are the new boy band (nicely alliterative, no?) Many companies are screaming, fainting, and throwing underwear at security researchers**** to find problems in their code and insisting that This Is The Way, Walk In It: if you are not doing bug bounties, your code isn’t secure. Ah, well, we find 87% of security vulnerabilities ourselves, security researchers find about 3% and the rest are found by customers. (Small digression: I was busting my buttons today when I found out that a well-known security researcher in a particular area of technology reported a bunch of alleged security issues to us except – we had already found all of them and we were already working on or had fixes. Woo hoo!) I am not dissing bug bounties, just noting that on a strictly economic basis, why would I throw a lot of money at 3% of the problem (and without learning lessons from what you find, it really is “whack a code mole”) when I could spend that money on better prevention like, oh, hiring another employee to do ethical hacking, who could develop a really good tool we use to automate finding certain types of issues, and so on. This is one of those “full immersion baptism” or “sprinkle water over the forehead” issues – we will allow for different religious traditions and do it OUR way – and others can do it THEIR way. Pax vobiscum. Q. If you don’t let customers reverse engineer code, they won’t buy anything else from you. A. I actually heard this from a customer. It was ironic because in order for them to buy more products from us (or use a cloud service offering), they’d have to sign – a license agreement! With the same terms that the customer had already admitted violating. “Honey, if you won’t let me cheat on you again, our marriage is through.” “Ah, er, you already violated the ‘forsaking all others’ part of the marriage vow so I think the marriage is already over.” The better discussion to have with a customer —and I always offer this — is for us to explain what we do to build assurance into our products, including how we use vulnerability finding tools. I want customers to have confidence in our products and services, not just drop a letter on them. Q. Surely the bad guys and some nations do reverse engineer Oracle’s code and don’t care about your licensing agreement, so why would you try to restrict the behavior of customers with good motives? A. Oracle’s license agreement exists to protect our intellectual property. “Good motives” – and given the errata of third party attempts to scan code the quotation marks are quite apropos – are not an acceptable excuse for violating an agreement willingly entered into. Any more than “but everybody else is cheating on his or her spouse” is an acceptable excuse for violating “forsaking all others” if you said it in front of witnesses. At this point, I think I am beating a dead – or should I say, decompiled – horse. We ask that customers not reverse engineer our code to find suspected security issues: we have source code, we run tools against the source code (as well as against executable code), it’s actually our job to do that, we don’t need or want a customer or random third party to reverse engineer our code to find security vulnerabilities. And last, but really first, the Oracle license agreement prohibits it. Please don’t go there. * I suspect at least part of the anger of customers in these back-and-forth discussions is because the customer had already paid a security consultant to do the work. They are angry with us for having been sold a bill of goods by their consultant (where the consultant broke the license agreement). ** The only analogy I can come up with is – my bookshelf. Someone convinced that I had a prurient interest in pornography could look at the titles on my bookshelf, conclude they are salacious, and demand an explanation from me as to why I have a collection of steamy books. For example (these are all real titles on my shelf): Thunder Below! (“whoo boy, must be hot stuff!”) Naked Economics (“nude Keynesians!”)*** Inferno (“even hotter stuff!”) At Dawn We Slept (“you must be exhausted from your, ah, nighttime activities…”) My response is that I don’t have to explain my book tastes or respond to baseless FUD. (If anybody is interested, the actual book subjects are, in order, 1) the exploits of WWII submarine skipper and Congressional Medal of Honor recipient CAPT Eugene Fluckey, USN 2) a book on economics 3) a book about the European theater in WWII and 4) the definitive work concerning the attack on Pearl Harbor. ) *** Absolutely not, I loathe Keynes. There are more extant dodos than actual Keynesian multipliers. Although “dodos” and “true believers in Keynesian multipliers” are interchangeable terms as far as I am concerned. **** I might be exaggerating here. But maybe not.


Facebooktwittergoogle_plusredditpinterestlinkedinmail

[ISN] Islamic State has ‘best cyber offence’ of any terrorist group

http://www.zdnet.com/article/islamic-state-has-best-cyber-offence-of-any-terrorist-group/ By Stilgherrian ZDNet News June 5, 2015 “ISIS [also known as Islamic State] came onto the scene very quickly, but they already have arguably the best cyber offensive capability of any extremist movement out there, and it’s still early days,” Mikko Hypponen, chief research officer at F-Secure said. “We still haven’t seen real physical damage being done by any extremist group, and it’s probably going to take a while until we see it. But these guys are the first ones that actually have some existing hackers who have joined them and moved in from the West,” Hypponen told the AusCERT Information Security Conference on Australia’s Gold Coast in his keynote address on Friday morning. “It’s not yet really a big problem, but obviously this isn’t getting better, this is getting worse,” he said. One such hacker is Abu Hussain Al Britani, a British citizen that F-Secure had been tracking as a traditional hacker three years ago. They lost track of him two years ago, but found him again last summer in Syria. Al Britani has been kicked off Twitter around 20 times, but appears to be tweeting again this week. […]


Facebooktwittergoogle_plusredditpinterestlinkedinmail

[ISN] House Intel Chief Wants To Increase Cyber Attacks Against Russia

http://www.defenseone.com/politics/2014/10/house-intel-chief-wants-increase-cyber-attacks-against-russia/95675/ By Patrick Tucker defenseone.com October 2, 2014 The United States should be conducting more disruptive cyber attacks against nations like Russia, according to Rep. Mike Rogers, R-Mich., chairman of the House Intelligence Committee. “I don’t think we are using all of our cyber-capability to disrupt” actors in Russia targeting U.S. interests, he said at The Washington Post’s cybersecurity summit on Thursday. Rogers cited attacks out of Russia on the U.S. financial sector, specifically against JP Morgan Chase in August, as an example of nation states targeting U.S. companies and financial interests. The FBI is currently investigating whether or not the attacks were a response to the financial sanctions that the United States placed on Russia in March. He didn’t directly implicate Putin’s government in the attack on JP Morgan Chase, but he called the attempted breaches a “decision [made] on the basis of sanctions,” and asked whether the intent was “to monitor transactions or go in destroy enough data to cause harm to transactions?” […]


Facebooktwittergoogle_plusredditpinterestlinkedinmail

[ISN] Cybersecurity Skills Shortage Poses Threat in Singapore

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-22/cybersecurity-skills-shortage-looms-in-singapore-southeast-asia.html By Brian Leonal Bloomberg.com June 22, 2014 Singapore’s ability to fight a rising threat from hackers is hindered by a skills shortage and lack of awareness among companies, according to the computer security firm that runs a state-supported training center. “We do see a lack of capability and capacity in skilled professionals, and that’s partly due to massive demand across the world that stretches an already small, existing pool of people,” Bryce Boland, Asia Pacific chief technology officer at Milpitas, California-based FireEye Inc. (FEYE), a cybersecurity firm, said in an interview in Singapore last week. Singapore, a global financial center which relies on its image as a safe and stable location to lure business, has suffered high-profile online attacks on government websites and security breaches involving companies’ client data in recent months. Cybersecurity risks pose a challenge as the government steps up efforts to link public facilities and infrastructure for real-time data in Southeast Asia’s only developed nation. “Organizations increasingly recognize that the approach toward cyber security must be organization-wide,” said Lyon Poh, head of IT Assurance and Security at KPMG LLP in Singapore. “However, they lack people with the experience to set up a comprehensive cyber security defense system to promptly detect and respond to cyber threats.” […]


Facebooktwittergoogle_plusredditpinterestlinkedinmail

[ISN] Patch management flubs facilitate cybercrime

http://www.networkworld.com/news/2014/032714-solutionary-280149.html By Ellen Messmer Network World March 27, 2014 Failures in patch management of vulnerable systems have been a key enabler of cybercrime, according to the conclusions reached in Solutionary’s annual Global Threat Intelligence Report out today, saying it sees botnet attacks as the biggest single threat. The managed security services provider, now part of NTT, compiled a year’s worth of scans of customers’ networks gathered through 139,000 network devices, such as intrusion-detections systems, firewall and routers, and analyzed about 300 million events, along with 3 trillion collected logs associated with attacks. Solutionary says it relies on several types of vendor products for these scans, including Qualys, Nessus, Saint, Rapid7, nCircle and Retina. Solutionary also looked at the latest exploit kits used by hackers, which include exploits from as far back as 2006. Solutionary found that half of the vulnerability scans it did on NTT customers last year were first identified and assigned CVE numbers between 2004 and 2011. “That is, half of the exploitable vulnerabilities we identified have been publicly known for at least two years, yet they remain open for an attacker to find and exploit,” Solutionary said in its Global Threat Intelligence Report. “The data indicates many organizations today are unaware, lack the capability, or don’t perceive the importance of addressing these vulnerabilities in a timely manner.” […]


Facebooktwittergoogle_plusredditpinterestlinkedinmail

My Latest Gartner Research: Context-Aware Security and Intelligence-Sharing Concepts Merge to Create Intelligence-Aware Security Controls

… security enforcement mechanisms toward a sharing of security intelligence to improve security. Not all security technologies are currently capable of sharing intelligence, and many currently lack significant intelligence-sharing maturity and response-orchestration capability. The most important benefits ofintelligence sharing will come from sharing and the subsequent …

Gartner clients may access this research by clicking here.


Facebooktwittergoogle_plusredditpinterestlinkedinmail